Post by Prof. Hernan Huwyler, MBA, CPA, CAIO
AI GRC Director | AI Risk Manager | Quantitative Risk Lead
Speaker, Corporate Trainer and Executive Advisor
Top 10 Responsible AI and Risk Management by Thinkers360
Why Detecting Concealed Payments Has Become A Board Level Priority
Detecting illegal payments concealed in accounting records remains a
top priority for both internal audit and anti-bribery compliance
functions. Corruption risk is a significant and growing concern for
global organizations, driven by an expanding web of extraterritorial
anti-corruption legislation. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the
UK Bribery Act 2010, France's Sapin II, and Brazil's Clean Company Act
all impose obligations that extend well beyond domestic borders,
creating overlapping enforcement regimes that demand coordinated
internal controls.
Enforcement activity continues to intensify.
The U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange
Commission have collectively imposed billions of dollars in FCPA-related
penalties over the past decade. Whistleblower programs, particularly
under the Dodd-Frank Act, have created powerful financial incentives for
individuals to report suspected violations directly to regulators, with
the SEC Whistleblower Program having awarded over two billion dollars
since its inception. These dynamics make it essential for organizations
to detect and prevent improper payments before they surface externally.
Identifying illegal payments hidden in accounting records is no longer a narrow
compliance exercise. It is a core governance issue that sits at the
intersection of anti bribery compliance, financial controls, internal
audit, third party risk management, and investigations. For global
companies, the stakes are high. Enforcement authorities continue to
pursue cases under extra territorial anti corruption laws, whistleblower
activity has increased, and regulators now expect companies to
demonstrate not only that they have policies in place, but that they can
identify and respond to suspicious transactions in practice.
Improper
payments are rarely recorded as bribes. They are usually disguised as
legitimate business expenses. In many cases, they appear as commissions,
consulting fees, rebates, customs charges, facilitation arrangements,
marketing support, travel expenses, charitable contributions, or vendor
payments that appear ordinary on the surface. In more sophisticated
schemes, illegal payments are concealed through inflated invoices,
success fee arrangements with vague deliverables, layered
subcontracting, shell entities, or payment flows involving offshore
accounts and unrelated jurisdictions.
That is why anti bribery
risk cannot be addressed through policy language alone. It requires a
control architecture capable of identifying transactions that are
technically booked within approved accounting categories but are
economically inconsistent with the underlying business purpose.
Why Accounting Records Remain Central To Anti Bribery Detection
Under
major anti corruption enforcement regimes, including the US Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, the integrity of books and records remains a
central issue. Companies can face enforcement not only for improper
payments themselves, but also for failures in internal accounting
controls and the maintenance of inaccurate records. This is one of the
most important practical realities in anti bribery compliance. Illegal
payments are often detected not from direct evidence of intent, but from
inconsistencies in documentation, approval logic, service validation,
pricing patterns, vendor onboarding, or payment behavior.
For that
reason, the most effective anti bribery programs do not separate ethics
risk from financial control design. They treat accounting data,
procurement data, third party due diligence, and approval workflows as
connected evidence streams.
Why Improper Payments Are Difficult To Detect
Improper
payments are deliberately designed to evade detection. The most
straightforward schemes disguise bribes as legitimate business expenses
such as agent commissions, third-party fees, consulting charges, or
reimbursed travel and entertainment costs. More sophisticated
arrangements involve inflated invoices, deceptive commission structures,
fictitious services, and the use of complex webs of intermediaries,
shell companies, and offshore bank accounts.
Under the FCPA, even
when a substantive bribery charge cannot be proven, organizations face
significant liability for books and records violations and failures to
maintain adequate internal accounting controls. This means that the
quality of accounting records and the integrity of the control
environment are themselves compliance obligations, not merely audit
concerns.
Mapping The Risk Factors Behind Improper Payments
Effective
corruption risk assessment requires evaluating the full environment
surrounding each transaction rather than relying on a single risk
indicator. Organizations that anchor their bribery risk maps exclusively
to country-level corruption indices, such as the Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index, miss the broader
transactional context that drives actual exposure.
A robust risk mapping framework balances four dimensions.
Where the transaction occurs
encompasses the jurisdiction where the service is provided, the
location from which payment is requested, and the domicile of the
supplier. High perceived corruption jurisdictions, tax haven countries,
new market sectors, and offshore locations all elevate this dimension of
risk.
Who is involved examines the parties to
the transaction, including public officials, politically exposed
persons, small or newly established companies, new vendors without
established track records, subcontractors, joint venture partners,
associations, and any associated persons as defined by applicable
legislation. The completeness and findings of due diligence, including
any unresolved red flags, and the verification of beneficial ownership
are critical elements of this assessment.
What service is provided
evaluates the nature of the engagement. Consulting and advisory
services, government licenses and permits, customs and logistics
services, public procurement, complex or first-of-their-kind projects,
and transactions where incentives or pressures exist to complete a deal
on aggressive timelines all carry elevated risk.
How the service is contracted and paid
focuses on the commercial and financial mechanics. The payment method,
flat-fee structures versus success-based compensation, commission
clauses, reimbursed expenses, upfront payments, the use of cash, and the
routing of payments through jurisdictions unrelated to the underlying
service are all relevant indicators.
Balancing these four
dimensions provides a holistic view of corruption exposure.
Organizations that assess only one or two of these factors, typically
the country dimension alone, create gaps in their risk coverage that
more sophisticated bribery schemes are specifically designed to exploit.
How Corruption Risk Should Be Assessed In Practice
Many
companies still make a basic but costly mistake in corruption risk
assessments. They over concentrate on country risk and assume that
corruption exposure is driven primarily by geography. Geography matters,
but it is only one element of the transaction risk profile. A stronger
model evaluates corruption risk through the interaction of location,
counterparties, business purpose, and payment mechanics.
A more
complete risk view starts with where the service is delivered, where the
payment is requested, where the third party is domiciled, and whether
the transaction touches jurisdictions associated with weak transparency,
sanctions concerns, customs complexity, or tax opacity. It also
considers who is involved, including public officials, state owned
entities, politically exposed persons, newly formed vendors,
subcontractors, joint venture partners, customs brokers, commercial
agents, and intermediaries with limited operating history or negative
due diligence findings.
The nature of the service is equally
important. Certain services are structurally higher risk because they
are difficult to verify or can be used to justify discretionary
payments. These often include consulting, licensing support, customs
clearance, permit acquisition, business development, logistics support,
market access work, and public procurement support. Risk also rises when
a project is unusually complex, commercially pressured, fast tracked,
or dependent on external approvals.
The final dimension is how the
transaction is structured and paid. Payment method, fee logic,
reimbursement provisions, use of advances, round sum compensation,
success based compensation, vague statements of work, accelerated
approvals, split invoices, foreign currency requests, or payments to
accounts in unrelated jurisdictions can all materially elevate risk.
A
mature corruption risk model balances all of these dimensions. It does
not treat any single factor as determinative. It recognizes that a low
transparency jurisdiction does not automatically make a transaction
improper, and that a payment in a lower risk country may still be highly
suspicious if the service cannot be substantiated or the payment
structure lacks economic logic.
Why Compliance And Internal Audit Need A Shared Detection Model
Compliance
and internal audit both play important but distinct roles in detecting
illicit payments. Compliance typically owns anti bribery policy, third
party due diligence standards, training requirements, escalation
protocols, and ongoing monitoring of high risk transactions and third
parties. Internal audit provides independent assurance over the design
and operating effectiveness of controls, the adequacy of governance, and
the consistency of execution across business units.
These roles
should not be merged, but they should be coordinated. In practice, both
functions rely on overlapping risk indicators, control points, and
transactional evidence. If they use different definitions of bribery
risk, different red flag criteria, or different scopes for testing, the
result is fragmented oversight and duplicated effort. If they align on
risk factors, data triggers, and control objectives, they can achieve
stronger coverage with less burden on the business.
The most
effective model is one in which compliance and internal audit share a
common view of transaction risk, while preserving their separate
mandates. Compliance performs targeted monitoring and program oversight.
Internal audit independently evaluates whether the anti bribery control
environment is designed and operating effectively. Each function
benefits from the work of the other, but neither substitutes for the
other.
A Better Way To Structure Collaborative Reviews
A
practical way to coordinate anti bribery detection is to organize the
review model around control design, operating effectiveness, and risk
based monitoring. This structure is more useful than dividing work only
by function because it aligns the assurance approach to how illicit
payments actually bypass controls.
When organizations evaluate
control design, they assess whether the preventive and detective control
framework is capable of stopping or surfacing improper payments before
they are embedded in normal accounting activity. When they evaluate
operating effectiveness, they test whether those controls are
consistently functioning in real transactions and whether exceptions are
being challenged. When they monitor, they use data and trigger based
review to identify payment behavior that warrants additional
investigation or targeted audit attention.
This three part structure creates a practical bridge between governance, transaction testing, and analytics.
Evaluating Control Design Through An Anti Bribery Lens
Control
design reviews should go beyond traditional financial authorization
logic. They should assess whether the process architecture makes
concealment difficult.
A strong design review examines segregation
of duties across vendor onboarding, contract approval, service
confirmation, invoice approval, master data changes, and payment
release. The objective is not simply to confirm that different
individuals are involved, but to ensure that the sequence of approvals
creates meaningful challenge and that approval authority is appropriate
to transaction risk and value.
Contracting controls also deserve
close attention. Agreements with third parties should include anti
corruption clauses, audit rights where appropriate, compliance with
applicable laws, cooperation obligations, and termination rights tied to
misconduct or control failures. It is equally important that the actual
statement of work be specific enough to allow later verification of
what the third party was expected to deliver.
The integrity of
accounting descriptions is another underappreciated control. Accounting
teams should be trained to use booking categories that reflect the
economic substance of the transaction and to maintain meaningful entry
descriptions. Large manual journal entries supported only by auxiliary
spreadsheets, especially where line item support is missing or vague,
create opportunities for concealment and should be tightly controlled.
Financial
controllers and approvers should also be trained to identify anti
bribery red flags in routine finance activity. This includes unusual
travel and entertainment patterns, unsupported reimbursements, high risk
petty cash usage, weak service confirmations, inconsistent vendor
banking details, and commercially irrational pricing patterns.
Testing Operating Effectiveness Where Illegal Payments Actually Hide
Testing
for operating effectiveness should focus on whether the control
framework can withstand real world pressure. This means selecting
transactions not only through conventional statistical sampling, but
also through judgment based selection informed by known bribery risk
patterns and red flags. Statistical samples are useful for some control
objectives, but on their own they may miss the very transactions that
merit scrutiny because corruption schemes are often low frequency, non
random, and intentionally structured to look exceptional but
explainable.
A stronger testing approach includes payments across
multiple risk levels, with deliberate inclusion of transactions that are
not necessarily high value but display unusual characteristics. These
may include unnecessary intermediaries, vague consulting arrangements,
success based compensation with no measurable output, emergency vendor
onboarding, repeat reimbursements without adequate support, unusual
discounts or rebates, or payments approved shortly before key regulatory
or commercial milestones.
Third party testing is especially
important. Reviews should examine whether due diligence was completed
before engagement, whether red flags were resolved rather than simply
documented, whether the third party had the capability to perform the
service, whether beneficial ownership and control were understood,
whether screening was refreshed appropriately, and whether the actual
service provided can be corroborated through evidence beyond the invoice
itself.
Approvals should also be tested for substance. Effective
approval is not the presence of a signature in workflow. It is evidence
that the approver assessed legitimacy, reasonableness, service
performance, pricing, and potential conflicts of interest. If a company
cannot demonstrate how an approver validated the business purpose of a
payment, then the approval may have limited control value even if it was
technically completed.
Using Monitoring To Surface Concealed Risk Earlier
Ongoing
monitoring is one of the highest value areas in anti bribery detection
because it can identify suspicious activity before it becomes systemic.
The most effective monitoring models use data analytics to identify
transactions and vendor behavior that deviate from expected patterns and
then route those signals into compliance review, finance challenge, or
internal audit follow up.
Monitoring should focus on transaction
types that historically present bribery and fraud exposure, including
gifts, meals, entertainment, travel, sponsorships, charitable donations,
political contributions where permitted by law, agent commissions,
distributor rebates, consulting fees, customs and logistics charges, and
manual adjustments that affect vendor balances or expense
classifications.
It is also important to monitor payment
destinations and methods. Payments to offshore accounts, payments in
currencies that do not align with the contractual arrangement, split
payments, advances, round dollar payments, unusual prepayments, credits
and rebates without clear commercial support, and sudden changes in bank
account details all warrant closer review.
Trend analysis can be
particularly effective. Out of pattern commissions by service type,
abrupt pricing increases or decreases, changes in lease or equipment
related expenses, repeated invoice amounts just below approval
thresholds, and recurring payments to recently created vendors can all
signal elevated risk. On their own, these indicators do not prove
misconduct. Their value lies in helping the organization prioritize
review where the transaction logic appears economically weak or control
behavior appears abnormal.
What High Performing Programs Do Differently
Organizations
with stronger anti bribery detection capability do not rely on isolated
controls. They connect due diligence, contracting, procurement,
accounts payable, general ledger data, employee expenses, and issue
management into a coherent control environment. They also understand
that corruption risk overlaps with fraud risk, sanctions risk, and money
laundering exposure. That overlap matters because the same
transactional patterns that indicate a bribery concern may also indicate
vendor fraud, collusion, false billing, or concealment of beneficial
ownership.
High performing programs also avoid treating anti
bribery testing as a once a year review. They use targeted analytics and
focused assurance cycles that adapt as the business changes. Market
entry, distributor model changes, public sector expansion, customs
intensive operations, and urgent project delivery environments all
create periods where transaction scrutiny should increase.
Most
importantly, mature programs ensure that findings lead to response. A
red flag is only useful if the organization has a clear process to
investigate it, escalate it, document conclusions, and adjust controls
where necessary.
Common Weaknesses That Undermine Detection
Several recurring weaknesses tend to reduce the effectiveness of anti bribery detection even in otherwise mature organizations.
One
is overreliance on due diligence at onboarding without enough scrutiny
of what happens after the third party is engaged. A third party may pass
initial screening and still become a bribery risk through changes in
ownership, personnel, subcontracting, payment structure, or business
pressure.
Another is excessive dependence on form based approvals.
If the approval process captures signatures but not real challenge,
then improper payments can move through the system with apparent control
compliance.
A third weakness is insufficient integration between
compliance monitoring and internal audit assurance. If compliance
identifies recurring anomalies but audit does not assess whether the
underlying control design is flawed, the organization treats symptoms
instead of causes. If internal audit identifies design weaknesses but
compliance does not adapt monitoring to reflect those weaknesses, risk
remains under observed.
A final weakness is poor accounting
transparency. Ambiguous general ledger descriptions, inconsistent use of
expense categories, unsupported manual journal entries, and poor vendor
master governance can make even a good anti bribery program far less
effective.
Final Perspective
Detecting
illegal payments in accounting records requires more than vigilance and
more than policy. It requires a transaction level view of corruption
risk supported by control discipline, data analysis, and coordinated
assurance. Companies that treat anti bribery compliance, internal audit,
and financial control as separate worlds will continue to miss
important signals. Companies that connect them through a shared risk
model and a common evidence base will be far better positioned to
prevent, detect, and respond to concealed payments.
For boards,
audit committees, chief compliance officers, and heads of internal
audit, the practical question is no longer whether anti bribery controls
exist. The more important question is whether those controls can detect
a payment that was intentionally designed to look ordinary. That is the
standard that matters.
References
US Department of Justice and US Securities and Exchange Commission. A Resource Guide To The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
US Department of Justice. Evaluation Of Corporate Compliance Programs
Organisation For Economic Co operation and Development. Good Practice Guidance On Internal Controls, Ethics, And Compliance
International Organization for Standardization. ISO 37001 Anti Bribery Management Systems Requirements With Guidance For Use
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. Internal Control Integrated Framework
Institute of Internal Auditors. Global Internal Audit Standards and guidance relevant to fraud and corruption risk oversight
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. Occupational Fraud Reports and anti fraud control guidance
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