Picture a finance manager who types her password into a login page that looks exactly like her bank's. The attacker behind the page now holds a working credential, and she notices nothing until the transfer alert arrives. A passkey would have refused to answer that page, because the browser ties each passkey to the real domain where it was created. That single design property is why passkeys are more secure than passwords against phishing and remote attacks, and it is the reason this article exists.
The short answer for risk owners is yes, with conditions. A passkey keeps a private key on the user's device and gives the website only a public key, so a breached server or a fake page has nothing worth stealing. What changes is where the attacker goes next: the phone in a thief's hand, the recovery flow, the cloud account that syncs the keys, malware on the laptop, and the old password that most accounts still keep alive. A recent TechRadar explainer by Mark Gill reaches a similar verdict. It calls passkeys an upgrade, warns against treating them as a cure-all, and names device access and platform lock-in as the main residual risks. This piece adds recovery, rogue enrollment and malware to that list and turns each gap into a control.
You can apply the nine controls below this week. They are ranked from most efficient to least, where efficient means the amount of risk removed for each hour of effort and each user you inconvenience. The first six suit any individual or small team. The last three matter most to security teams, administrators and anyone who builds a login. Each control names an owner and the evidence an auditor would ask for, so the work survives a review.
